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Voluntary pledges to make intellectual property broadly available to address urgent public 
health crises can overcome administrative and legal hurdles faced by more elaborate legal 
arrangements such as patent pools and achieve greater acceptance than governmental 
compulsory licensing. 
 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) — patents, copyrights and similar forms of legal 
protection — relate to virtually every aspect of the COVID-19 response, from vaccines, 
diagnostics and therapeutics to medical equipment, tracking systems, software apps and other 
innovations1,2. Traditionally, IPR offers the developers of new technologies the exclusive right to 
exploit their innovations while recouping R&D and other expenditures. But IPR also gives its 
owners the ability to stop others from conducting research as well as manufacturing and 
distributing products.  
During the current COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, we and others have observed 
instances in which IPR restrictions, and even fear and uncertainty around IPR, have hindered 
effective research on vaccines and therapies as well as the development, manufacturing and 
distribution of ventilators, testing kits, protective equipment and other medical supplies 
(referred to as “crisis critical products”1).  
COVID-19 differs from other recent public health crises — cancer, HIV/AIDS, Ebola, 
malaria, malnutrition — with respect to its sudden onset, its rapid spread, the lack of any 
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known vaccine or cure and resulting shortages of critical medical equipment. The convergence 
of these factors has prompted both governments and IPR holders around the world to seek 
ways to increase the availability of IPR necessary to combat the pandemic. Governmental 
compulsory licensing, IPR pools and voluntary IPR pledges have all been used in the past, 
though in situations that differ in important respects from the COVID-19 pandemic. Each is 
designed to result, to a greater or lesser degree, in a publicly-accessible “commons” of rights 
and technologies that are broadly available for use to support an important public health goal3. 
Here, we compare and contrast these differing approaches to IPR commons formation and 
assess their suitability to address the COVID-19 crisis.  
 
Voluntary pledges 
A growing number of organizations have publicly committed to make their IPR freely 
available in the fight against COVID-19. These IPR “pledges” take various forms and have 
different labels, but share a common lineage that extends back to commitments made for 
decades by technology firms to support the use of interoperability standards, open software 
and emerging technology platforms4,5. As such, these pledges and the licenses that are 
associated with them are irrevocable once granted and legally enforceable under precedents 
that have been recognized in jurisdictions around the world4.  
As seen in Table 1, there are several varieties of IPR pledges4,6,7. Some cover different 
types of IPR (patents, copyrights, designs, etc.) and can impose different restrictions and 
limitations (e.g., duration, field of use). IPR pledges can be made unilaterally by a single 
organization (e.g., Medtronic, AbbVie) or through coordinated efforts of organizations that 
commit to the same basic terms (e.g., Wellcome Trust Publishers’ Pledge, Open COVID Pledge). 
Some, like the Open COVID Pledge, which was developed by a coalition of scientists, engineers 
and legal experts (including the authors), are self-executing, inasmuch as any interested 
organization is automatically granted the right to use the licensed IPR without further 
paperwork. Others, like the Harvard-MIT-Stanford (HMS) pledge, provide a framework but still 
require organizations that wish to use pledged IPR to negotiate a separate license agreement 
with the IPR holder.  
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Some unilateral pledges, such as the one made by equipment manufacturer Medtronic, 
cover not only formal IPR, but also data files and designs for equipment and parts, which are 
often essential when manufacturing such devices. This pledge, like that made by 
pharmaceutical manufacturer AbbVie, is limited to a particular product (a ventilator in the case 
of Medtronic, a drug in the case of AbbVie). While these pledges are narrower than open-ended 
pledges covering all of an organization’s IPR, their specificity makes their application to 
particular technologies clear, which enables usability. It may be more difficult for potential 
users to determine how they can use IPR that is licensed on a broad but nonspecific basis8.  
The Medtronic pledge also adopts a ‘share alike’ feature, borrowed from the well-known GNU 
General Public License (GPL) and certain Creative Commons licenses, which require that the 
user of pledged IPR make its modifications and improvements openly available on the same 
terms as the pledged IPR. Such provisions are intended to prevent the users of freely licensed 
IPR from making proprietary improvements to that IPR to gain a competitive advantage over 
the pledgor. Protective measures like these could be particularly important when competitors 
are required to cooperate to supply crisis-critical products.  
Like the Wellcome Trust Publishers’ Pledge for copyrighted material, the Open COVID 
Pledge was not developed by a particular IPR owner, but as a neutral mechanism for adoption 
by an unlimited number of IPR owners. Organizations adopting the Open COVID Pledge can 
utilize a template license that was developed by the coalition or customize one of their own. 
These customizations can more specifically detail the IPR pledged, the duration of the license, 
and specific limitations that may be required by law or prior agreements that bind the IPR 
owner. Since its launch, the Open COVID Pledge has been adopted by organizations large and 
small, holding in excess of 250,000 patents worldwide. The similar Japan-based Open COVID-19 
Declaration boasts 96 signatories that have pledged close to one million patents. Industry 
sectors most heavily represented by these pledges include computing, telecommunications, 
social media, software, equipment, automotive and chemicals. 
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Pledging and pricing 
Despite their variations, all of the IPR pledges described above share a key feature: they 
enable users, typically anywhere in the world, to use the pledged IPR without the threat of 
litigation, and to do so for free for at least some period. Though royalty-free pledges do not 
generate immediate monetary compensation for IPR holders, they are not economically 
irrational. While the IPR owner necessarily foregoes direct revenue associated with the use of 
its IPR, it only does so for a limited period (the duration of the pandemic and one year 
thereafter) and has the ability to negotiate fee-bearing licenses after that period and in fields 
other than COVID-19.  
Previous scholarship has identified a range of motivations that lead IPR holders to make 
their IPR available for broad use without compensation, including accelerating diffusion of an 
emerging technology, seeking favor with governmental agencies and courts, enhancing public 
relations and acting in accordance with corporate social responsibility and philanthropic 
goals4,7,9. IPR pledges that have been made in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic likely 
fall into several of these categories.  
Some IPR owners might be concerned that users of their pledged IPR will charge 
excessive prices for resulting products, which is not in the spirit of either their pledge or societal 
expectations in the current pandemic crisis. In order to prevent this behavior, some of the 
above-mentioned pledges, such as the HMS university pledge and Oxford University’s pledge, 
require that users charge “fair” or no more than “cost-plus” prices for resulting products. The 
Open COVID Pledge, on the other hand, does not contain such user pricing clauses, as the 
designers were concerned that such a constraint could deter some producers from using the 
pledged IPR in a setting where the widespread distribution of needed products and services is 
paramount.  
 
Pledges versus pools 
In addition to the IPR pledges discussed above, proposals have been made, both at the 
United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) and within the European Union, for the 
assembly of IPR relating to COVID-19 in one or more formal IPR pools. Whereas a coordinated 
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pledge is a joint initiative of multiple organizations to share their IPR on similar terms, an IPR 
pool is typically a private arrangement among IPR owners to operate under one another’s IPR, 
to manage and administer it through a centralized mechanism, and often to license it to third 
parties, with proceeds allocated among the pool participants according to an agreed formula. 
IPR pools have been formed for nearly a century in industries ranging from aviation and 
semiconductors to copyrighted music and performances. One of the major advantages of pools 
is the consolidation of complementary IPR rights into a single source, overcoming problems of 
fragmentation and “thickets” that can arise with respect to diversely held IPR3.  
IPR pools were actively considered in response to the SARS outbreak of 2002–03, the 
H5N1 influenza outbreak of 2005, and the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 200910,11. Yet despite a 
perceived need for aggregation of distributed IPR rights, pools, which generally require complex 
and coordinated negotiations among IPR owners, were never formed in these cases for a 
variety of practical, financial and competitive reasons10,11.  
In the case of COVID-19, the precise contours of proposed pooling efforts have not yet 
been announced. One potential model is the WHO’s Medicines Patent Pool (MPP). MPP is not 
technically an IPR pool. Rather, it serves as an intermediary or clearinghouse to which 
organizations can license IPR relating to HIV, tuberculosis and hepatitis C. MPP then negotiates 
outbound sublicenses (sometimes royalty-bearing) with generic drug manufacturers serving 
low-income countries. To date, several significant IPR holders including AbbVie, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, Gilead Sciences and Pfizer have granted royalty-free licenses to MPP, which has in turn 
granted 22 sublicenses to generic product manufacturers (http://medicinespatentpool.org).  
While the goals of such government-sponsored arrangements are consistent with those 
of the IPR pledges, they generally require greater time, financial backing and political willpower 
to implement than the lightweight and self-executing mechanisms inherent to pledges. And in a 
time of pandemic, when every day counts, the voluntary pledging approaches discussed here 
can serve as useful complements to more formalized government-driven arrangements. This 
being said, passive pledges that lack ongoing stewardship and active efforts to match users with 
pledged IPR have been shown in the past to underperform8. Thus, programs such as the Open 
COVID Pledge, which is administered and hosted by Creative Commons, have sought to 
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implement outreach strategies both with respect to IPR holders and potential users of pledged 
IPR.  
 
Pledges versus compulsory licensing 
In addition to the voluntary mechanisms described above, some governments have 
threatened or taken action to authorize the use of privately held IPR without the consent of the 
owners. Such compulsory licensing approaches are well known mechanisms with established 
legal frameworks under national law and international treaty. In the current crisis they have 
already been enacted in Canada, Israel, Germany, Chile and Ecuador, with active discussions 
elsewhere12. While such measures can address health needs within the countries enacting 
them, they have limited effectiveness on a global scale, particularly if major countries like the 
United States and China decline to follow suit. However, this is exactly the scale on which IPR 
access is needed during the current COVID-19 crisis.  
Moreover, compulsory measures are typically opposed by IPR owners, decreasing the 
likelihood of meaningful cooperation or knowledge transfer among IPR owners and users. And 
as shown elsewhere, such cooperation above and beyond passive licenses of IPR may be 
important to the effective deployment of complex technologies for crisis-critical products8,13. 
Indeed, the threat of compulsory licensing and other governmental action has seemingly 
encouraged some companies to make broader, global pledges. One example of this effect may 
be AbbVie, which announced the public availability of IPR covering its patented HIV drug Kaletra 
shortly after the Israeli government authorized generic manufacture of the drug.14  
 
Pledges versus the public domain 
IPR pledges occupy a legal middle ground between the full exclusivity afforded by the 
law and an outright contribution to the public domain.  Like open source code software 
licenses, IPR pledges coupled with license agreements enable the IPR owner to retain some 
degree of control over the IPR in question.  Most importantly, many of the pledges described 
above last for limited periods of time (i.e., during the pandemic and for a short period 
thereafter) and apply only to limited fields of use (i.e., addressing COVID-19). This limited scope 
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is important, as many medical and other technologies used to combat COVID-19 have other 
applications, and it is unlikely that for-profit firms would be willing to relinquish all markets for 
their products as a condition to contributing to the fight against COVID-19. Moreover, if a user 
develops a useful product based on pledged IPR, then it will have an incentive to seek a 
commercial license from the IPR owner if it wishes to continue to market that product after the 
pandemic. In addition, some pledges, such as the Open COVID Pledge, allow for “defensive 
suspension” of the licenses granted. That is, if a pledgor is sued for patent infringement, it may 
suspend any licenses that it previously granted to the aggressor. Thus, while the contribution of 
IPR to the public domain achieves many of the same access goals as IPR pledges, it can be a less 
attractive option for commercial entities.  
 
Conclusions 
While IPR aims to reward innovators for technological developments, it can also become 
a barrier to rapid and efficient collective action in the face of an urgent public health 
emergency. While more draconian measures have been suggested to eliminate IPR barriers to 
research and manufacturing of products essential to the fight against COVID-19 (e.g., 
compulsory licensing), a less onerous path involves voluntary pledges made by IPR holders. 
Such pledges — temporary in duration and narrow in scope — can enable critical public health 
research and manufacturing of crisis-critical products, while at the same time preserving for 
their owners the prospect of financial rewards and influence over markets after the pandemic 
ends. By the same token, such pledges are lightweight and efficient, avoiding the 
administrative, legal and political delays that have hindered prior pooling proposals in response 
to public health emergencies.  
Nevertheless, the lightweight, self-executing and sometimes broad nature of pledges 
could challenge users seeking to find specific pledged IP without ongoing stewardship and 
active assessment of the rights being made available. Although the full economic and health 
implications of ongoing IPR pledges may take time to be appreciated fully, we recommend that, 
with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments encourage, and possibly incentivize, the 
voluntary pledging mechanisms described here.  
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This being said, the profile of organizations that have made IPR pledges in the current 
pandemic has been uneven. While there has been significant representation by the technology 
and equipment sectors, comparatively little voluntary action has been taken to date with 
respect to IPR covering vaccines or therapeutics (with a few exceptions such as AbbVie’s 
unilateral pledge of Kaletra and pledges by some Japanese chemical firms with pharmaceutical 
divisions). Simple economic forces may be at work here, as firms that anticipate a direct and 
significant windfall from the sale of COVID-19 products may be less inclined to commit their IPR 
to the public cause, or to make it available to their competitors. In these cases, governmental 
compulsory licensing may be the only realistic mechanism for making IPR broadly available. 
Moreover, if society wishes to incentivize the discovery of new treatments for COVID-19 (as 
opposed to the repurposing of existing ones), it is not clear that compulsory licensing will result 
in the greatest level of private innovation. Thus, for some sectors of the economy, biopharma in 
particular, neither pledges nor compulsory licensing may achieve optimal results.  
Nevertheless, as we have seen, countless technologies from outside the biopharma 
sector are critical to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic — emergency response, medical 
equipment, diagnostic kits, protective gear, software modeling, social distancing and many 
more. To the extent that these technologies can be made broadly available and accessible 
through voluntary IPR pledges, we believe that the effort to combat the pandemic and to 
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Table 1  Selected IPR pledges in response to COVID-19* 
IPR holder Pledge 
date  
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*All pledges are archived at http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/. **As of 29 May 2020, 
includes 30 publishers of scientific journals and proceedings, including American Chemical Society, 
American Physical Society, British Medical Journal, Cell Press, Elsevier, Karger, Lancet, New England 
Journal of Medicine, Public Library of Science, Royal Society, Science Journals, Springer Nature, Taylor & 
Francis, Wiley and Wolters Kluwer. ***As of 24 August 2020, includes 30 companies and institutions 
including Amazon, AT&T, Facebook, Fujitsu, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, 
Mitsubishi Electric, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Sandia National 
Laboratory and Uber, among others. ****As of 24 August 2020, includes 96 Japanese industrial firms. 
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